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A Note on the Endogeneity of Pay-Performance Relationship in
Professional Soccer
Abstract
Torgler and Schmidt (2007) have recently found a positive impact of pay on player performance in
German soccer, measured by the number of goals and assists scored within a season. This note shows
that their result is spurious as both a player's wage and goal/assist scoring are driven by individual
playing abilities. Holding the (unobserved) timeinvariant and the varying talent of a player constant, the
positive pay-performance link is no longer statistically significant. In professional soccer, wages seem to
buy talent rather than motivation.
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1. Introduction 
Recently, Torgler and Schmidt (2007) (hereafter referred to as TS) found a 
positive (but diminishing) pay-performance relationship in professional German 
soccer. They show that a player’s salary affects his field performance as measured 
by the number of goals and assists scored. Up to a certain point, monetary rewards 
seem to be an adequate instrument for enforcing work motivation and 
performance. TS motivate their investigation of a non-linear pay-performance link 
at the individual level as an extension of the study of Simmons and Forrest (2004), 
who found a positive relationship between wage expenditures and performance at 
the team level. In doing so, however, TS neglect the fact that Simmons and 
Forrest (2004) do not explain their results with an incentive effect of wages. 
Rather, they argue that a positive wage expenditure-performance link is the result 
of teams competing on the market for playing talent in which higher salaries 
attract superior talent, thus leading to better team performance.1 
Based on this reasoning, this note argues that the significant pay-performance 
link in professional soccer disappears when a player’s talent is properly accounted 
for. Whereas motivational factors may play a role concerning team collaboration 
and interaction (see, e.g., Franck and Nüesch, 2007), neither a low salary nor one 
that is too high can hinder a player from striving for the great satisfaction of 
scoring a goal. Professional soccer players do not need to be incentivized to score 
goals. Using an extended data set of the same league, we will show that the 
significant pay-performance link of TS is spurious. After controlling for both 
time-constant and varying playing abilities, a player’s wage no longer impacts 
goal and assist scoring performance.   
 
2. Talent proxies  
Having panel data, individual fixed effects may capture the time-constant 
talent heterogeneity of players. Besides inborn talent, however, there exists a large 
variety of ability characteristics that change over time: physical fitness, technical 
skills, and key player attitudes to name just a few. Such time-varying aspects of 
playing talent are hard to identify from the outside. A team’s coach, however, 
knows quite exactly who is at his best and who is not. He constantly observes and 
evaluates the performance of his players and fields a team by selecting the best 
players. As it is a measurable outcome of extensive screening and monitoring, we 
regard the number of seasonal field appearances as an adequate proxy of a 
player’s varying playing ability relative to the other team members.2 Information 
about whether or not someone played for a national team in a specific season 
                                                 
1 On a team level basis, there exist numerous studies that relate team performance to the team’s 
wage expenditures with the data envelopment analysis approach (e.g., Haas, 2003a,b; Barros and 
Leach, 2006a) and with frontier production functions (e.g., Barros and Leach, 2006b; Barros and 
Leach, 2007; Barros and Garcia-del-Barrio, 2008). Barros and Garcia-del-Barrio (2008) provides a 
good overview of this literature.  
2 The fact that a coach’s player selection for a particular match depends on the relative playing 
ability within the team is accounted for by using team dummies. Other factors that may influence 
the number of seasonal appearances, such as injuries, are likely to be stochastic.   
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offers another way to capture aspects of the changing talent of a player. TS either 
controlled for time-constant talent using a player fixed effects approach or 
considered time-varying talent characteristics, including national team 
membership or national team appearances as instrumental variables; but they 
never controlled for both at the same time.  
 
3. Data 
In order to test the mediating influence of talent on the individual pay-
performance link, we use an extended version of TS’s data set. After adding four 
more seasons, it results in an unbalanced panel of 1596 players (4746 player-
season observations covering twelve seasons between 1995/96 and 2006/07), for 
whom we have individual pay and performance data.3 Data on goal and assist 
scoring as well as player background information were collected from the 
webpages www.kicker.de and www.fussballdaten.de. We control for unobserved 
team heterogeneity regarding the pay-performance link by including team fixed 
effects. Concerning salary data, we use the same source as TS: hardcopies of the 
Kicker Sportmagazin. For ease of comparison, we use the same set of variables as 
TS and first replicate their findings both in the fixed effects and 2SLS 
specification. Secondly, we include further covariates of a player’s talent like the 
number of appearances. .  
 
4. Results 
The fixed effect estimates in Table 1 show that a player’s wage does no longer 
significantly affect performance if the number of seasonal appearances is taken 
into account (specifications (2) and (4)). The time-varying aspects of talent 
increase the variance explained by the model (R2 within) from 9% to 24% 
regarding goals and from 8% to 26% regarding assists.  
Tables 2 and 3 illustrate the 2SLS estimates of goal and assist scoring using 
status as an international player and national team membership as instruments of a 
player’s wage. Since these instruments partly reflect a player’s changing playing 
ability, the humped-shaped pay-performance relationships of TS already lose 
statistical significance if player fixed effects are included. Nevertheless, the 
number of seasonal appearances still explains additional 14% in the variation of 
goals (specification (7)) and 18% in the variation of assists (specification (10)). 
The more a player plays, the more he scores.  
In addition, we find evidence for a humped-shaped relationship between a 
player’s performance and his age. The high joint significance of the player fixed 
effects illustrates the importance to control for the time-constant unobserved talent 
of a player. Team and season fixed effects are not jointly significant in all 
specifications.  
 
                                                 
3 Along the lines of TS, goalkeepers have been neglected in the estimations.  
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Table 1: Fixed effect estimates of player performance  
Independent variables Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value
Salary
ABSOLUTE VALUE (t-1) 0.284 ** 2.26 -0.062 -0.52 0.238 * 1.53 -0.059 -0.42
SQ ABSOLUTE VALUE (t-1) -0.020 * -1.41 0.008 0.53 -0.008 -0.31 0.015 0.66
Time-constant talent
PLAYER FIXED EFFECTS yes *** yes *** yes *** yes ***
Time-varying talent
APPEARANCES 0.125 *** 20.63 0.107 *** 24.49
Controls
AGE 1.218 *** 6.06 0.498 *** -3.46 0.962 *** 5.95 0.344 *** 2.38
AGE SQ -0.024 *** -6.69 -0.011 *** 2.03 -0.018 *** -6.29 -0.007 *** -2.68
CHANGED TEAM -0.697 ** -1.97 0.643 ** 2.03 -0.184 -0.67 0.968 3.81
DEFENCE -0.603 * -1.70 -0.620 * -1.92 -0.007 -0.02 -0.021 -0.07
MIDFIELD -0.424 -1.20 -0.335 -1.07 0.063 0.20 0.139 0.51
TEAM yes *** yes yes *** yes ***
SEASON yes yes yes yes
0.089 0.244 0.075 0.255
Change in R2 within 0.155 0.180
4746 4746 4746 4746
R2 within
(2) (3)b
Dep. V.: Goals Dep. V.: Goals Dep. V.: Assists
Notes: Player fixed effect estimates. Robust SEs. aReplication of model 2 in TS. bReplication of model 4 in TS. 
Salary data are expressed in 2003 Euro millions and adjusted for inflation.  Significance tests are one-tailed for 
directional variables and two-tailed for controls. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, 
respectively.
Observations
(4)
Dep. V.: Assists
(1)a
 
Table 2: 2SLS estimates of goal scoring  
Independent variables Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value
Salary
ABSOLUTE VALUE (t-1) 1.290 *** 5.26 0.367 0.63 0.645 1.27
SQ ABSOLUTE VALUE (t-1) -0.041 * -1.30 -0.028 -0.47 -0.063 -1.24
Time-constant talent
PLAYER FIXED EFFECTS yes *** yes ***
Time-varying talent
APPEARANCES 0.119 *** 18.42
Controls
AGE 0.255 * 1.91 1.170 *** 3.12 0.134 0.30
AGE SQ -0.004 * -1.73 -0.023 *** -3.51 -0.005 0.01
CHANGED TEAM -0.313 -1.22 -0.685 ** -2.18 0.681 ** 0.28
DEFENCE -3.118 *** -22.29 -0.601 * -1.74 -0.605 * 0.32
MIDFIELD -2.365 *** -17.09 -0.426 -1.46 -0.355 0.27
TEAM yes ** yes *** yes
SEASON yes *** yes yes
R2 (within) 0.344 0.089 0.230
Change in R2 within 0.141
F-test for excluded IVS 269 *** 269 *** 226 ***
Anderson canon. corr. LR statistic 514 *** 514 *** 436 ***
Observations 4746 4746 4746
(5)a (6) (7)
Notes: Two-Step-Least-Square (2SLS) estimation with being a foreigner and playing for the national team weighted 
with the centered national team's FIFA scores as instruments. aReplication of model 5 in TS. Salary data are 
expressed in 2003 Euro millions and adjusted for inflation. Significance tests are one-tailed for directional variables 
and two-tailed for controls. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively.
Dep. V.: Goals Dep. V.: Goals Dep. V.: Goals
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Table 3: 2SLS estimates of assist scoring  
Independent variables Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value
Salary
ABSOLUTE VALUE (t-1) 1.179 *** 6.06 0.048 0.10 0.254 0.64
SQ ABSOLUTE VALUE (t-1) -0.059 ** -2.23 0.011 0.23 -0.016 -0.40
Time-constant talent
PLAYER FIXED EFFECTS yes *** yes ***
Time-varying talent
APPEARANCES 0.104 *** 20.60
Controls
AGE 0.031 0.29 1.071 *** 3.56 0.183 0.77
AGE SQ 0.000 -0.13 -0.020 *** -3.74 -0.004 -0.94
CHANGED TEAM -0.117 -0.52 -0.211 -0.84 0.985 *** 4.39
DEFENCE -1.191 *** -14.29 -0.010 -0.04 -0.014 -0.06
MIDFIELD 0.003 0.04 0.067 0.29 0.130 0.62
TEAM yes ** yes *** yes ***
SEASON yes *** yes yes
R2 (within) 0.263 0.073 0.251
Change in R2 within 0.177
F-test for excluded IVS 269 *** 269 *** 226 ***
Anderson canon. corr. LR statistic 514 *** 514 *** 436 ***
Observations 4746 4746 4746
Notes: Two-Step-Least-Square (2SLS) estimation with being a foreigner and playing for the national team 
weighted with the centered national team's FIFA scores as instruments. aReplication of model 6 in TS. Salary data 
are expressed in 2003 Euro millions and adjusted for inflation. Significance tests are one-tailed for directional 
variables and two-tailed for controls. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively.
(9) (10)
Dep. V.: Assists Dep. V.: Assists Dep. V.: Assists
(8)a
 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
In summary, salary does not affect individual goal and assist scoring on the 
field. Instead, both pay and performance are endogenous to a player’s talent. 
Salaries buy talent rather than motivation, at least regarding the highly visible 
aspect of scoring.4 So far, we have treated the number of appearances as a proxy 
for the time-varying aspects of individual playing ability as identified by the 
team’s coach. There exists, however, a totally different, rather irrational 
explanation for why the number of seasonal appearances may bias TS’s pay-
performance relationship. Staw and Hound (1995) empirically show that playing 
time in the National Basketball Association (NBA) is not only granted according 
to a player’s expected on-court productivity but also according to the draft order. 
Staw and Hound (1995) explain their finding by a sunk-cost effect as the amount 
teams spent for players influences how much playing time they get. In order to 
test potential sunk-cost effects in German soccer, further empirical analyses 
                                                 
4 We consider that motivation – unlike talent – is not endogenous to the player’s salary, at least in 
our special context, in which performance in itself is generating a lot of satisfaction. If motivation 
were seen as an aspect of talent, we could not make this distinction. However, we regard the 
differentiation between talent and motivation as plausible, as the idea that salaries do not affect 
motivation (but talent) is common in other fields like organizational science as well (see, e.g., 
Osterloh and Frey, 2000). 
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would be necessary. Either way, a player’s wage impacts the number of 
appearances, either directly due to a sunk-cost effect or indirectly via the player’s 
talent.5  
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